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IRCENT DZCMIONS 63
children or decendants (and not collateral heirs) and the same children enjoy
the homestead during minority, it has been held that their homestead right
amo ants to an absolute exemption, forever free from sale for the payment of
debts; Armour Y. Lewis, 252 Mo. 568, and cases in accord. In this state
from 1865 to 1875. the statute gave the widow a homestead in fee simple, simi-
iar to the result in some cases under, the statute today. It will be seen that
the title of any person claiming through a purchaser at a sale of homestead
property for the payment of debts, eve though it be by order of the probate
court, is very doubtful and should be accepted with caution.
INSURANCE-LIABILITY OF INSURANCE COMPANY FOR SLAN-
DER OF ITS AGENT.
In the case of Vowles v. Yakisk 179 N W 117 (Iowa) plaintiff's grocery
store was destroyed by fire, and agent of defendant insurance company
%hile adjusting the loss, asserted in te presence of witnesses that plaintiff had
bulned the building. In an action for slander against the Insurance company,
the court says that the r.4 question of the case is not whether the company
had expressly authorized se words spoken, but rather, whether the agent at
the time he uttered the words complained of was acting within the scope of
his authority and in the actual performance of his duties touching the subject-
matter of the transaction. The mere fact that the agent was acting in that
capacity at the time the words were spoken would not fasten liability on the
company, unless the test of the scope of his employment was satisfied. The
court found that the agent at the time he spoke the words in question was act-
ing beyond his authority, as it was not his duty to inquire into the origin
of the fire, and therefore the company could not be liable for his words unless
a subsequent ratification could be proved, and further that- an acceptance of the
agent's settlement did not amount to a ratification where the sole question ne-
gotiated in making the settlement was the amount of loss sustained and not the
origin of the fire. A verdict of five thousand dollars damages in the trial
c urt was reversed and the case remanded.
But the dissenting opinion of Weaver, C. J. seems to rest more upon the
weight of authority and the better reasoning. He is inclined to view the con-
clusion, of the.court as an umecessary refinement upon the laws of master and
servant, and holds that the slanderous remarks of the agent can hardly be dis-
sociated from his official employment and that the company should be held
liable for such remarks where the agent was acting in its behalf at the time the
remarks were made. He cites a number of authorities which seem to be well
considered opinions of respectable courts as sustaining his conclusions, Fensky
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 264 Mo. 154. Nesbit v. C. R. L & P. R. R. Co., 163
Ia. 39. Palmeri v. Railroad Co., 133 N. Y. 261. A complete review of this
question will be found in a note in 13 A. L R., 1142.
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